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The Global Entry of New Pharmaceuticals: 
A Joint Investigation of Launch Window and Price  
 
 
Abstract 
Research on the launch of new products in the international realm is scarce. The present paper is 
the first to document how launch window (difference in months between the first worldwide 
launch and the subsequent launch in a specific country) and launch price are interrelated and how 
regulation influences both launch window and launch price. The research context is the global – 
50 countries worldwide – launch of 58 new ethical drugs across 29 therapeutic areas. We show 
that the fastest launch occurs when the launch price is moderately high and the highest launch 
price occurs at a launch window of 85 months. We find that the health regulator acts strategically 
in that the extent to which it delays the launch of a new drug increases with the price of the new 
drug. We also find that regulation overall increases the launch window, except for patent 
protection. Surprisingly, regulation does not directly impact launch price. The descriptive 
information on average launch window and launch price and the interconnection between launch 
window and launch price allows managers in ethical drug companies to build more informed 
decisions for international market entry. This study also provides public policy analysts with 
more quantitative evidence regarding launch window and launch price on a broad sample of 
countries and categories.  
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1. Introduction 
Marketing scholars have always posed a strong interest in the launch of innovations (for 
examples, see Golder & Tellis, 1993; Shankar, Carpenter, & Krishnamurthi, 1998 and 1999). 
However, research on the launch of new products in the international realm is scarce. Rare 
exceptions focus: (1) on the choice between a waterfall and a sprinkler strategy in international 
entry (Kalish, Mahajan, & Muller, 1995; Libai, Muller, & Peres, 2005; Stremersch & Tellis, 
2004; Tellis, Stremersch & Yin, 2003); and (2) whether products diffuse faster in lead countries 
(in which the product was introduced first) than in lag countries (in which the product was 
subsequently introduced) (e.g. Dekimpe, Parker, & Sarvary, 2000; Eliashberg & Helsen, 1996).  
The lack of attention to international product entry decisions contrasts sharply with the 
high relevance that international launch time decisions have for today’s globally operating firms. 
The commercialization or launch phase is an important phase for a company (Hultink, Griffin, 
Robben, & Hart, 1998), in which it makes decisions on launch time and price, both of which 
have large implications for future profits (Gregson, Sparrowhawk, Mauskoph, & Paul, 2005; 
Hultink et al., 1998; Urban & Hauser, 1993). In essence, launch time and price are important 
determinants of the evolution and distribution of cash flows across time and countries.  
In the pharmaceutical market – the context of the present paper – regulatory bodies such 
as the FDA (the Food and Drug Administration) and EMEA (the European Medicines Evaluation 
Agency; the European counterpart of the FDA) review and approve a new drug’s effectiveness 
and safety. After scientific approval, the firm negotiates about market access with local health 
regulators (typically, at the country level), to jointly determine launch time and launch price, 
even though they potentially may have opposite interests. Ethical drug firms (firms that sell 
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prescription drugs) aim to recoup R&D investments through early access (i.e. a long life cycle 
under patent protection) and a high price, both of which have an important impact on ethical 
drug companies’ bottom line (Boulding & Christen, 2003; Danzon, Wang, & Wang, 2005; 
Wagner & McCarthy, 2004). Health regulators wish to contain health costs, but at the same time 
make new life-enhancing and life-saving drugs available to the population (Danzon et al., 2005). 
To contain health budgets, many countries have introduced some form of regulation that restricts 
a firm in setting prices freely. For instance, Spain has set a threshold (12-18% of allowable cost) 
that regulates the profit margins ethical drug firms can make, which may put downward pressure 
on prices in Spain and make manufacturers less keen to enter Spain promptly (Kanavos, 2001). 
Prior studies (Danzon et al., 2005; Kyle, 2006 and 2007; Lanjouw, 2005) have examined 
launch timing, without accounting for launch price. Other authors have studied launch price, 
without accounting for launch timing (e.g. Berndt, 2000; Danzon & Chao, 2000a; Danzon & 
Furukawa, 2003 and 2006; Danzon & Kim, 1998; Huttin, 1999). The present paper examines 
how launch timing and launch price interrelate and how regulation affects both decisions. In 
terms of launch timing, we focus on launch window, which is the difference in months between 
the first worldwide launch and the subsequent launch in a specific country. We gathered monthly 
launch windows and launch prices for 58 new drugs launched by ethical drug companies, across 
29 different therapeutic categories and 50 – both developed and developing (also see, Burgess & 
Steenkamp, 2006) – countries worldwide, yielding a rich dataset, on both the drug- and country-
level. We simultaneously estimate a launch window equation and a launch price equation, 
capturing the endogeneity of these decisions.   
We find that launch price has a U-shaped effect on launch window, while launch window 
has an inverted U-shaped effect on launch price. In our sample, the fastest launch occurs when 
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the launch price is moderately high and the highest price occurs at a launch window of about 85 
months. We also find that health regulators act strategically as the launch window increases with 
the price of the new drug. Overall, we find that regulation increases launch window. Contrary to 
our expectations, we do not find that regulation directly influences launch prices. Interestingly, 
such regulations may serve to reduce prices faster over the life cycle, rather than the launch price 
per se, for which Stremersch and Lemmens (2009) provide anecdotical evidence, based on the 
price pattern they observe in Belgium, Canada, Germany, Switzerland, UK and US, in their 
Figure 1. Our findings are new to the literature, are based on a large sample of new 
pharmaceutical drugs, and have high relevance for both firms and regulators. Within the bounds 
of the data, our model can give insights into hypothetical situations, such as,  how a further delay 
in the entry of a new drug may affect launch price. The descriptive information on average 
launch window and launch price and the interconnection between launch window and launch 
price allows managers in ethical drug companies to build more informed decisions for 
international market entry. This study also provides public policy analysts with more quantitative 
evidence regarding launch window and price on a broad sample of countries and categories.  
2. Theoretical Background 
This section first reviews past literature on international launch window and launch price, 
both in marketing and economics. Then, we develop hypotheses on the interrelationship between 
launch window and launch price and on the effect of regulation on launch window and launch 
price. We end with a discussion of the other variables that may affect launch window and launch 
price, which we control for in our estimation.  
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2.1. Past Literature on International Launch Window and Price 
Table 1 summarizes prior literature on international launch of new products
1
 and 
international pricing, published in economics and marketing. From Table 1, we learn that 
previous studies have not yet considered the interrelationship between launch window and 
launch price. Prior research on international launch has focused on identifying determinants of 
launch windows. Prior research on international pricing mostly examines bilateral price 
comparisons, while examining the determinants of such differences only in a few cases. In such 
papers, scholars have examined the influence of competition or a firm’s country of origin on 
international pricing differences. We also learn from Table 1 that our study is one of the most 
comprehensive ever on this topic, given the number of new products and countries studied and 
the richness of the covariate set included in our model.  
2.2. The Interrelationship of Launch Window and Launch Price 
In the pharmaceutical industry, launch window and launch price are the result of an 
undisclosed negotiation process between health regulators (e.g. governments and government 
institutes), on the one hand, and ethical drug companies, on the other hand (Danzon et al., 2005; 
Garattini & Ghislandi, 2007). The launch window and launch price are important to ethical drug 
companies as they affect the evolution and distribution of cash flows over time and countries. 
This incoming cash flow for firms corresponds to healthcare spending for health regulators.  
                                                 
1 We exclude studies on within-country order-of-entry or on firm entry from this overview. 
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Reference 
Dependent 
Variable 
Focal 
Independent Variables 
Launch 
Window 
Modeled? 
Launch 
Price 
Modeled? 
Number of 
Geographic 
Markets 
Number of 
Products 
Product Markets Key Findings 
Bolton & Myers 
(2003) 
Price sensitivity 
Service quality, type, 
and support 
No No 7 1 Software systems 
Service quality, type, and support have a significant positive influence on 
price elasticities. This effect depends on national and regional variables. 
Chintagunta & 
Desiraju (2005) 
Price level Home country of firm No No 5 3 Pharmaceuticals 
Firms charge a higher price for drugs in their home country. These firms 
behave more aggressively towards their competitors in their home 
market. 
Danzon & Chao 
(2000a) 
Bilateral drug price 
indexes 
Competition No No 7 171 Pharmaceuticals 
Within-country price competition influences differences in prices across 
countries. 
Danzon & 
Furukawa (2003) 
Bilateral drug price 
indexes 
/ No No 8 249 Pharmaceuticals Prices in Japan and the US are higher than in other countries. 
Danzon, Wang, & 
Wang (2005) 
Launch window 
Market size 
Competition 
Firm characteristics 
Yes No 25 85 Pharmaceuticals 
Countries with lower expected prices or smaller expected market size 
have larger launch windows (i.e., longer launch delays). 
Dawar & Parker 
(1994) 
Relative and 
absolute importance 
of price as a quality 
signal 
National (workforce, 
culture, …) and 
individual 
characteristics 
No No 38 1 
Consumer 
electronics 
Price as a quality signal does not depend on culture but is likely to 
depend on individual characteristics. 
Ekelund & Persson 
(2003) 
Price levels Competition No Yes 1 246 Pharmaceuticals Price regulation in Sweden discourages price competition. 
Goldberg & 
Verboven (2001) 
Price levels 
Firm characteristics 
(country of origin, costs, 
import quota 
constraints) 
No No 5 
Approx. 
150 
Cars 
Higher prices are partially attributable to a preference for domestic 
brands. 
Kalish, Mahajan, & 
Muller (1995) 
Launch window 
Competition, size and 
growth of foreign 
market, fixed cost of 
entry, product life cycle, 
innovativeness 
Yes No 
No empirical 
data 
No 
empirical 
data 
No empirical data 
A waterfall strategy is preferred under certain conditions such as high 
fixed entry costs and low competitive pressure. 
Kyle (2006) Launch window Firm characteristics Yes No 7 1,482 Pharmaceuticals 
New drugs are launched faster in countries where the headquarter of the 
company is located. 
Kyle (2007) Launch window Regulation Yes No 25 1,444 Pharmaceuticals Countries with price controls show larger launch windows. 
Lu & Comanor 
(1998) 
Price levels Competition No Yes 1 144 Pharmaceuticals 
The number of branded substitutes has a significant negative effect on 
launch prices. 
Rojas (2009) Price levels Company type No No 6 641 Pharmaceuticals 
Significant differences in the prices of identical drugs exist across Central 
American countries. 
This study 
Launch Window 
& 
Launch Price 
Regulation 
(economy, 
demography, 
competition, culture, 
drug, firm) 
 
Yes Yes 50 58 Pharmaceuticals 
Launch window has an inverted U-shaped effect on launch price, 
whereas launch price has a U-shaped effect on launch window. We 
also find that regulation overall increases the launch window, except 
for patent protection. Surprisingly, regulation does not directly 
impact launch price. 
Table 1: Overview of prior studies on international launch window and pricing and a comparison with the present study
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Beyond containing healthcare spending, health regulators may also have the population’s 
access to state-of-the-art healthcare as an objective. The combination of both objectives presents 
health regulators with a formidable challenge, because new drugs promise greater medical 
benefits, but typically at a higher price than prior alternatives. Thus, both from a regulator’s and 
from a firm’s perspective, launch price and launch window may be interrelated. 
The relationship between launch window and launch price has three distinct aspects: (1) 
the causal effect of launch price on launch window; (2) the causal effect of launch window on 
launch price; and (3) the joint determination of both. Next, we develop hypotheses on the first 
two aspects, while we will control for the simultaneity in the launch window and launch price 
decisions in our empirical tests.  
Let’s first consider the effect launch price may have on launch window. If the launch 
price of a new drug is high, the drug represents, ceteris paribus, a more attractive market 
opportunity for the ethical drug company, than when the launch price of a new drug is low 
(Financial Times, 2007), making them more keen to launch fast to maximize the net present 
value of its future revenue streams (Gregson et al. 2005). This argument is in line with Giaccotto, 
Santerre, & Vernon (2005) and Ridley (2007), who documented earlier that low prices may harm 
the worldwide launch of new drugs. Ethical drug firms may also be concerned that launching fast 
in low-price countries may drive down the drug’s price in high-price countries in the future 
(Gregson et al., 2005).  
Health regulators, ceteris paribus, may be increasingly negatively disposed to the launch 
of a new drug as it gets more expensive, given concerns over increasing healthcare budgets of 
which pharmaceutical drug expenses are a substantial part (Cohen, Faden, Predaris, & Young, 
2007; Gregson et al., 2005). Healthcare budgets are under pressure, all around the world – in 
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many developed countries because of an ageing population, in many developing countries, 
because of a growing population. The increased budget pressure has lowered health regulators’ 
aspirations to provide fast market access to expensive new drugs (Comanor & Schweitzer, 2007). 
Health regulators may soften the impact of expensive drugs on their budget by delaying their 
entry, either explicitly in the price negotiation, e.g. by not promptly agreeing to the 
manufacturer’s proposed price (Danzon et al. 2005) or by increasing the administrative approval 
burden on expensive medication.  
Given the opposing logic between firms and regulators, we propose a curvilinear 
relationship between launch price and launch window, in which launch occurs fastest at 
moderate launch prices. The reason is that a very low launch price may be unacceptable to the 
firm, while a very high price may be unacceptable to the regulator. In both cases, either the firm 
or the regulator will seek to delay launch to put pressure on the other party in the negotiation. 
Both parties will only align on a quick launch, if the price is moderate. This expectation is 
consistent with earlier findings in the negotiation literature that challenging, yet attainable, goals 
lead to an integrative solution for both parties involved (McAlister, Bazerman, & Fader, 1986). 
In sum, we hypothesize: 
H1: Launch price has a U-shaped effect on launch window.  
Next, let’s consider the effect of launch window on launch price. New drugs typically 
receive a fixed patent-protection period of 20 years from initial filing for approval of a new drug 
(Danzon et al. 2005; Dimasi, Hansen, & Grabowski, 2003; Kyle, 2006). After this initial filing, it 
typically takes between 8 and 12 years for a drug to be developed and clinically tested, before it 
is approved for commercial use by organizations such as EMEA in Europe and the FDA in the 
U.S. After approval, the applicant has a monopoly on marketing the approved substance for the 
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remaining years of the patent life cycle, on average for 11 years (Grabowski & Kyle 2007). An 
ethical drug firm aims to recuperate its R&D expenditures – discovery and the different stages of 
clinical development and testing – and market entry expenditures – local cost effectiveness 
studies, conferences with key opinion leaders and physician detailing, among others – over the 
life cycle of a drug. An ethical drug firm generates the dominant share of its profits when the 
drug is still under patent protection and has no bioequivalent competition (Lu & Comanor, 
1998). Pharmaceutical companies operating in an international context launch at different times 
in different countries worldwide because of different approval and administrative procedures or 
because of differences in countries’ market attractiveness. The larger the launch window 
becomes, e.g. because of long administrative procedures, the less time under patent protection 
remains for the firm in the global context to recuperate its expenses for the drug, and the more 
the firm will insist on a higher price to make up for the lost time under exclusivity. 
The health regulators may show an opposite reaction to launch window. As time goes by, 
more information on the drug spreads around the world and the drug loses its novelty. Generic 
alternatives become a more prominent benchmark as patent expiry comes closer (Morton, 1999), 
and a larger volume of independent studies in foreign populations outside a clinical setting (i.e., 
when the drug is commercially available on foreign markets) may call into question the drug’s 
efficacy (e.g. Duloxetine) or raise important safety issues (e.g. Vioxx) (see Sood & Stremersch, 
2010). Thus, the health regulator’s willingness to pay for the drug may decrease over time. 
Combining both arguments, we propose an inversed U-shaped effect of launch window 
and launch price, in which launch price is highest at moderate levels of launch window. At 
moderate levels of launch window, the firm can still make money under patent protection if the 
price is high enough, to make up for local market entry expenditures. At very low levels of 
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launch window, the firm will accept a lower launch price more easily, as the drug enjoys a full 
life under patent protection, by which the firm starts recuperating R&D expenditures and gains 
resources for international market access immediately. At very high levels of launch window, the 
health regulator’s reference point will be based on generic drug prices. The firm itself may also 
already be in “generic” mode as its drug is reaching patent expiration globally and it prepares for 
generic competition. Therefore, at very high levels of launch window, both will align more easily 
on a relatively low launch price as a prelude to generic competition.  
 We hypothesize: 
H2: Launch window has an inverted U-shaped effect on launch price.  
2.3. The Effect of Regulation on Launch Window and Launch Price 
To control pharmaceutical spending, many countries apply various forms of regulatory 
restrictions, which may affect launch window and launch price (Abbott, 1995; Ekelund & 
Persson, 2003; Kanavos, 2001; Mossialos, Mrazek, & Walley, 2004).  We discuss each of these 
regulatory restrictions and their hypothesized effect on launch window and launch price. 
2.3.1. Ex-Manufacturer Price Regulation 
The first regulatory requirement we consider is the presence of ex-manufacturer price 
control. Ex-manufacturer price control caps the ex-manufacturer price (the price charged by the 
manufacturer to the wholesaler) of a pharmaceutical product. A country’s public health 
administration determines a maximum price or reservation price that a manufacturer can charge 
(Danzon et al., 2005). Belgium, Greece and Portugal are examples of countries with a strict ex-
manufacturer price regulation. Ex-manufacturer price control may slow down market access as it 
often lengthens the price negotiation process between regulator and manufacturer. Heuer, Mejer, 
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& Neuhaus (2007) and Kyle (2007) found for a limited sample of countries that ex-manufacturer 
price control delays new drug launch. Furthermore, Mossialos et al. (2004) state – without an 
empirical test – that countries with such a control are more likely to have lower introductory 
prices than countries without such a control. Ekelund and Persson (2003) and Lu and Comanor 
(1998) show that introductory prices are not lower in a country with a price cap regulation than 
in a country without a price cap regulation. Danzon and Chao (2000b) show across a sample of 7 
countries that the prices decline more with molecule age in countries that apply ex-manufacturer 
price control than in countries that do not apply this control. Although the evidence is mixed, we 
may expect launch prices to be lower in countries that apply this price control system than in 
countries that do not apply this price control system. 
We hypothesize: 
H3: New drugs are launched (a) later and (b) at a lower price in countries with ex-
manufacturer price regulation than in countries without ex-manufacturer price regulation. 
 
2.3.2. Profit Regulation 
Public policy administrators may also influence the general price levels of drugs more 
indirectly by restricting the profits ethical drug firms can obtain. In such regulatory context, drug 
companies are free to set their own prices but cannot exceed a predetermined profit ceiling 
(Jacobzone, 2000). The U.K. is a well-known example of a country that applies profit control 
regulation, in which the government negotiates with individual ethical drug companies on the 
amount of profit they can make (Borrell, 1999). While the direct effect of profit control on 
launch window is unexamined by prior scholars, we argue that it may slow down market access. 
In general, profit contribution by new products is considered to be large (Chandy & Tellis, 
1998). New drugs typically enhance ethical drug firms’ profitability (Wuyts, Dutta, & 
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Stremersch, 2004) and profit controls cap overall profit margins. Therefore, ceteris paribus, 
ethical drug firms will prefer to sustain mature drugs over launching their newly developed drugs 
on markets with profit controls (Rapp & Lloyd, 1994).  
The agreed upon return-on-capital threshold due to the profit regulation provides 
incentives for manufacturers to set their prices so that profits do not exceed this threshold. 
Exceeding these profit rates can lead to a penalty that forces companies to lower their prices 
(Novartis, 2004). Therefore, we may expect that companies set lower launch prices for their 
newly developed drugs in countries that control profit. 
Therefore, we hypothesize: 
H4: New drugs are launched (a) later and (b) at a lower price in countries with profit 
regulation than in countries without profit regulation.  
2.3.3 Cross-Country Reference Pricing 
The third regulatory restriction we consider is whether the regulator demands information 
from the manufacturer on drug prices in other countries or not. Under this regulation, health 
regulators require companies to supply information on prices, for the drugs they want to launch, 
in selected foreign countries, and will cap prices based on that information (Dukes et al. 2003). A 
good example is Austria where the government asks companies for notification on their ex 
manufacturer prices in other similar countries. 
While the intention of the regulator is to provide another capping mechanism on drug 
prices, the comparison between countries can create industry concern of a low introductory price 
to spill over to other countries. Therefore, cross-country reference pricing may show perverse 
effects (Hunter 2005). First, when a country applies cross-country reference pricing, firms will 
try to gain market access as early as possible, to avoid as many reference countries as possible. 
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Second, cross-country reference pricing may push prices upward, rather than downward. 
Typically, regulators that seek early drug access are more willing to concede on higher prices. 
Thus, the likelihood of a reference country having a high price, rather than a low price, is higher 
early in the life cycle, rather than later. Consequently, the reference set of a country is likely to 
contain a greater number of high-price than low-price countries, early in the life cycle, as 
compared to late in the life cycle.  
H5: New drugs will be introduced (a) earlier and (b) at a higher price in countries that have a 
cross-country reference pricing mechanism than in countries that do not have a cross-country 
reference pricing mechanism. 
2.3.4 Therapeutic Reference Pricing 
Therapeutic reference pricing refers to the presence (or absence) of a system to classify 
products into clusters based on therapeutic similarity (Danzon and Furukawa 2003). Health 
regulators set a reference price for each cluster based on a low priced product. If the 
manufacturer price is set above this reference level, the patient is surcharged. Therapeutic 
reference pricing is different from ex manufacturer price control in that it concerns the 
reimbursement level of a drug, rather than its price (Dukes et al. 1998). Germany, the 
Netherlands and New Zealand are three countries which are especially known for their 
therapeutic reference pricing system.  
Danzon and Furukawa (2003) claim that therapeutic reference pricing causes price 
pressure. The reason is that drugs, of which the price tops the reference point, require substantial 
co-pay by the patient, making the drug less attractive. Danzon and Ketcham (2004) show that 
more stringent systems of therapeutic reference pricing are associated with lower prices as 
compared to less stringent systems of therapeutic reference pricing.  
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Typically, therapeutic referencing would also delay launch as the administrative 
procedure requires an examination of therapeutic similarities, delaying market access. 
H6: New drugs will be introduced (a) later and (b) at a lower price in countries that apply a 
therapeutic reference pricing system as compared to countries that do not apply a therapeutic 
reference pricing system. 
 
2.3.5 Pharmaco-economic Evidence 
Regulators may require pharmaceutical firms to provide pharmaco-economic evidence on 
their new drug (Dickson et al. 2003). That way, regulators try to establish fair prices on the basis 
of calculations where the costs of a drug are compared with its direct and indirect benefits. 
Pharmaco-economic evidence inventories the cost-effectiveness of a treatment with a new drug 
as the ratio of the cost of treatment (including the drug price, but also for instance, hospital stays, 
surgery, etc.) to relevant measures of its effect (Garber and Phelps 1997). Australia has one of 
the most developed systems in this regard (Dukes et al. 2003). 
This requirement demands – on top of the clinical evidence provided to gain therapeutic 
approval by institutes such as FDA or EMEA – evidence on the cost-effectiveness in the local 
population that needs to be submitted in complicated administrative procedures. Therefore, it 
often causes a delay in market access, in a fashion similar to therapeutic reference pricing 
(Wilking and Jönsson 2005). On the positive side, it also makes the market access procedure 
more evidence-based (Stremersch and Van Dyck 2009), which may effectively yield higher 
prices, because of stronger clinical evidence.  
H7: New drugs will be introduced (a) later and (b) at a higher price in countries that require 
pharmaco-economic evidence as compared to countries that do not require pharmaco-
economic evidence. 
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2.3.6 Patent protection 
Ethical drug companies find countries that strictly enforce patent protection more 
attractive than countries that do not strictly enforce patent protection, because such regulation 
protects them from bio-equivalent, price competition. Thus, a stronger patent protection 
regulation may encourage ethical drug companies to enter relatively early, as their period of 
exclusivity after entrance is strongly protected. Furthermore, stronger patent protection may 
impose a downward pressure on launch prices as pharmaceutical companies can become more 
lenient on prices as there will be sufficient time left under patent protection to recuperate R&D 
expenditures.  
H8: New drugs will be introduced (a) earlier and (b) at a lower price in countries with more 
patent protection as compared to countries with less patent protection. 
2.4. Other Variables2 
We control for market size of a country, by including population size and health 
expenditures per capita, in our model to test the hypotheses above. Firms may be more prompt in 
their attempts to access large markets, thus decreasing launch window, but they will be less 
willing to compromise on launch price, as accepting a low price in large markets has large 
(negative) effects on anticipated profits. Also, health regulators in large markets may be more 
prompt in allowing new drugs to market, as the number of affected people is larger than in small 
                                                 
2 While unit sales will also affect the evolution and distribution of cash flows across time and countries, we consider 
its inclusion outside the scope of our study. Its full inclusion would require a model with a much higher complexity 
that accounts for adoption timing, repeat sales and compliance of patients. While this lower complexity comes at the 
threat of omitted variable bias, it seems reasonable to assume unit sales is not sensitive to introduction timing in the 
context of new pharmaceuticals (as documented empirically by Stremersch and Lemmens, 2009), nor is it likely that 
early unit sales is sensitive to launch price (physicians typically first prescribe a new treatment to patients who were 
impossible or difficult to treat with previously available alternatives, which makes early market adoption a function 
of drug efficacy and not much else, as argued in Vakratsas and Kolsarici, 2008). 
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markets. Firms may be more eager to launch in countries with high health expenditures per 
capita as these countries may have a more favorable attitude towards new drugs. On the other 
hand, higher health expenditures per capita could lower health regulators’ aspirations to provide 
fast market access to new drugs (Comanor & Schweitzer, 2007) or to allow high prices, as they 
feel a higher budget pressure.  
A second set of variables operationalizes a country’s national culture, for which we use 
the four dimensions identified by Hofstede (1980 and 2001): uncertainty avoidance, masculinity, 
individualism, and power distance. Hofstede (2001) has argued that members of uncertainty 
avoidant cultures show lower subjective health perceptions, as compared to members of cultures 
low in uncertainty avoidance (Hofstede, 2001). Low subjective health perceptions may 
encourage health regulators to allow prompt access to new drugs and be less price-sensitive. 
Thus, we expect launch window to be smaller and launch price to be higher in uncertainty 
avoidant countries, as compared to countries low in uncertainty avoidance. 
Masculine societies are characterized to a greater extent by assertiveness versus 
nurturance (Hofstede, 2001). Societies low in nurturance may perceive a lower need for medical 
care, unless when it is really necessary (Weber, Roberts, & McDougall Jr., 2000). Health 
regulators in masculine societies may be more resistant to allow prompt market access and show 
a lower willingness to pay, as compared to health regulators in feminine societies, especially for 
drugs that treat non-life-threatening diseases. Thus, we expect that, on the average, launch 
window is larger and launch price is lower in masculine countries, as compared to feminine 
countries.  
Hofstede (2001) has argued that members of a culture high in individualism show higher 
satisfaction towards health care and spend more money on healthcare as compared to cultures 
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low in individualism.  Therefore, we expect a smaller launch window and a higher launch price 
in individualistic countries, as compared to collectivist countries. 
Members of a culture high in power distance perceive a higher degree of inequality in 
power between themselves and the more powerful party. These societies are, therefore, often 
more bureaucratic (Hofstede, 2001). Therefore, we expect launch window to be larger in 
societies high in power distance, as compared to countries low in power distance. We have no ex 
ante expectation about the influence of power distance on launch price. 
Third, we control for the competition a drug faces within a category. The more competing 
drugs there are in a category, the higher the pressure on the firm to launch fast to secure adoption 
from newly diagnosed patients, but the lower the pressure on the regulator to grant market 
access. Strong competition also provides the health regulator with bargaining power to obtain a 
low price (Ekelund & Persson, 2003; Lu & Comanor, 1998). Thus, the effect of competition on 
launch window is unclear, while we expect the effect of competition on launch price to be 
negative. The latter expectation is consistent with Chintagunta and Desiraju (2005), who found 
that prices of drugs across 5 markets are lower when there is more competition.  
Fourth, we control for a home country effect on both launch window and launch price. 
Ethical drug companies’ larger familiarity with the home market’s therapeutic needs or health 
regulator’s favoritism towards these ethical drug companies may lead to a faster launch (Kyle, 
2006) and a higher launch price (Wagner & McCarthy, 2004). 
Fifth, we control for two additional covariates that we expect to influence launch 
window, but not launch price (Summer and EMEA). As approvals show a seasonal pattern 
around Summer holidays (Sietsema, 2006), we expect an influence of Summer on launch 
window. Second, while market access and price negotiations take place at the country-level, the 
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drug approval process in Europe is centralized. Given that the launch window (and not launch 
price) is co-determined by the (scientific) approval date of a new drug, EMEA member states will 
show greater similarity in launch window than countries that are not a member of EMEA. We 
expect launch window in EMEA countries to be shorter than in non-EMEA countries, because of 
administrative efficiencies. We do not expect an influence of EMEA membership on launch 
price as prices are set at the individual country level. The existence of parallel trade shows that 
the centralization of the drug approval process in the EMEA zone has not led to uniform prices 
(Danzon, 1998). We also control for two additional covariates that we expect to influence launch 
price, but not launch window (daily dosage and inflation rate). We add these two variables to 
avoid biases in the measure of launch price. The launch price of a drug in grams may be 
influenced by the drug’s defined daily dosage in grams. The launch price of a drug of which a 
patient needs a low daily dosage may be higher than the launch price of a drug of which a patient 
needs a high daily dosage. The reason is that health regulators and manufacturers negotiate on 
price based upon the total therapy cost, irrespective of the dosage quantity, because of the low 
variable (i.e. manufacturing) costs of the active ingredient in a drug. We also control for the 
inflation rate to make launch prices comparable across countries and time.  
Finally, we include therapeutic category dummy variables. The inclusion of these fixed 
category effects is in line with previous research on drug’s launch window (Danzon et al., 2005; 
Kyle, 2007; Lanjouw, 2005). Gregson et al. (2005) acknowledge that a country’s evaluation of 
the therapeutic category’s importance affects both launch window and price of a new drug in that 
therapeutic category. For example, the importance of the erectile dysfunction drug category (or 
other lifestyle drugs) may be judged differently across health regulators from different countries. 
We explain the operationalization of all variables in section 3.2.  
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3. Data 
In this section, we give an overview of the research context and define the variables, after 
which we present descriptive statistics of international launch window and launch price patterns.  
3.1. Research Context 
ATC1 and ATC3 Codes ATC4 Code Nr of Drugs 
 A Alimentary tract and metabolism   12 
A2B: drugs for peptic ulcer and reflux disease A2BC 1 
A3A: drugs for functional bowel disorder A3AE 1 
A4A: antiemetics and antinauseants A4AA 2 
A7E: intestinal anti-inflammatory agents A7EC 1 
A8A: antiobesity preparations, excl. diet products A8AB 2 
A10B: blood glucose lowering drugs, excl. insulins A10BG 3 
 A10BX 2 
 C Cardiovascular system   11 
C2K: other antihypertensives C2KX 1 
C3D: potassium sparing agents C3DA 1 
C9C: angiotensin II antagonists, plain C9CA 4 
C10A: lipid modifying agents, plain C10AA 4 
 C10AX 1 
 G Genito-urinary system and sex hormones   9 
G3X: other sex hormones and modulators of the genital system G3XC 1 
G4B: other urologicals, incl. antispasmodics G4BD 2 
 G4BE 5 
G4C: drugs used in benign prostatic hypertrophy G4CB 1 
 J Antiinfectives for systemic use  19 
J1D: other beta-lactam antibacterials J1DH 1 
J1F: macrolides, lincosamides and streptogramins J1FA 1 
J1M: quinolone antibacterials J1MA 3 
J1X: other antibacterials J1XX 2 
J2A: antimycotics for systemic use J2AX 2 
J5A: direct acting antivirals J5AE 3 
 J5AF 3 
 J5AG 1 
 J5AH 2 
 J5AX 1 
 R Respiratory system   7 
R3B: other drugs for obstructive airway diseases, inhalants R3BB 1 
R3D: other systemic drugs for obstructive airway diseases R3DC 1 
R6A: antihistamines for systemic use R6AX 5 
Table 2: Overview of the categories in our sample 
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We obtained data on launch window and launch price for 58 new drugs  in 5 anatomical 
therapeutic classes (WHO Collaboratory Center for Drug Statistics Methodology) and 50 
countries (both developed and developing countries) worldwide from IMS Health (see Table 2).
3
 
We selected these drugs for several reasons. First, these drugs’ retail sales represent more 
than 90% of the total sales volume, meaning they are consistently used in the outpatient 
environment. Second, because our analyses required information on launch window and launch 
price, we were limited to use the drugs launched as of 02/94 due to data storage procedures of 
our data supplier IMS Health. Column 1 in Table 2 represents the categories ATC1 and ATC3
4
 
to which our drugs belong. Column 2 gives the more specific fourth level ATC code and the last 
column gives the number of newly launched drugs in our dataset that belong to these categories. 
3.2. Variables 
We operationalize the launch window (LWij) of drug i in country j as the difference (in 
months) between the month in which the drug was launched in the first country worldwide and 
the month in which the drug was launched in country j (Danzon et al., 2005). The month of 
launch is the first month in which sales of the new drug are non-zero. As confirmed by IMS 
Health, our context involves highly regulated markets and firms at the local country level are 
prepared for launch in terms of product delivery. Therefore, the data are unlikely to be 
                                                 
3 Given the sample of 58 new drugs across 50 countries, there are 2,900 possible drug-country combinations. 
However, given right censoring in the data, of these 2,900 possible drug-country pairs, 2,045 remain. We will use 
these 2,045 observations for our descriptives on launch window and price, below. As we will regress launch price 
and launch window on other country characteristics, such as regulation, which is unavailable for 8 countries (Egypt, 
Jordan, Kuwait, Lebanon, Peru, Tunisia, Uruguay, and Venezuela), our model estimation is based on 1,711 drug-
country pairs. This number is higher than 1,581 (2,045 – (58 drugs*8 countries)) because some of the right-censored 
observations overlap with the drug-country observations for which regulatory information is missing. 
4 The number in ATC1 and ATC3 refers to the categorization level. The third level ATC code (ATC3) gives a more 
specific drug categorization than the first level ATC code (ATC1). 
  
22 
systematically left-censored. If a drug i is launched for the first time worldwide in January 2001 
in country X and it is launched subsequently in country Y in June 2001, the launch window of 
drug i in country X is equal to zero months and the launch window of drug i in country Y is 
equal to five months. The launch price (LPij) of drug i in country j is the natural logarithm of the 
ex-manufacturer price at launch (the selling price charged by the manufacturer to the wholesaler) 
in U.S. dollars per gram. To make drug prices comparable across countries, the drug prices in 
local currencies are converted to US dollars using the currency conversion rate at launch. All the 
drugs in our data were launched for the first time within the period 02/94 to 06/08. However, not 
all drugs are launched in all 50 countries by the end of our observation window. In other words, 
our data contain right-censored observations.  
While the regulatory environment is intrinsically complex, with subtle differences across 
countries, empirical analysis demands a clear-cut operationalization of the regulatory 
environment (e.g. Kyle, 2007; Stremersch & Lemmens, 2009; Vernon, Golec, & Keener 
Hughen, 2006). We measure the regulatory environment, based on prior research (e.g. Kyle, 
2007) and practitioner journals (Kanavos, 2001; PhRMA, 2004), using reports by ethical drug 
companies (e.g. Novartis, 2004), OECD (Jacobzone, 2000) and Urch publishing (Urch, 2001a 
and 2001b, 2002, and 2005), as well as personal conversations with countries’ health ministries, 
at the time of launch, as follows: 
 Ex-manufacturer price regulation: the presence (=1) or absence (=0) of a direct 
restriction of price levels by the regulator (Heuer et al., 2007; Kyle, 2007), denoted 
REGPRICECONTROLj;  
 Profit control regulation: the presence (=1) or absence (=0) of a threshold on the profits 
ethical drug companies can obtain, denoted REGPROFITj. 
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 Cross-country reference pricing regulation: the presence (=1) or absence (=0) of a 
requirement to submit information by the manufacturer on drug prices in other countries 
(Dukes, Haaijer-Ruskamp, de Jonckheere, & Rietveld, 2003), denoted REGCROSSj. 
 Therapeutic reference pricing regulation: whether health regulators generate a reference 
price for a cluster of drugs that have therapeutic similarities (=1) or not (=0), above which 
price the patient is surcharged (Danzon & Ketcham, 2003), denoted REGREFj; 
 Pharmaco-economic evidence regulation: whether health regulators ask for some proof of 
the drug’s cost effectiveness before launch (=1) or not (=0) (Dickson, Hurst, & 
Jacobzone, 2003; Dukes et al., 2003; Garber & Phelps, 1997), denoted 
REGPHARMACOj;  
 Strength of patent protection regulation: an index based on 5 levels of patent laws 
ranging from 0 to 5 for each country, from weak to strong patent protection (Ginarte & 
Park, 1997; Park & Wagh, 2000), denoted REGPATENTj.  
As to market size of a country, ideally we would control for the incidence of the disease 
in each country. However, given that such data is not available across countries, we control for 
population size at the time of launch (POPj), measured by the natural logarithm of the number of 
inhabitants of country j. Countries with a larger population size, ceteris paribus, contain more 
people suffering from a specific disease, than countries with a smaller population size. We also 
include the natural logarithm of health expenditures per capita in country j (HEALTHEXPj) at the 
time of launch. We obtained information on both variables from the Worldbank.   
We obtained data on the dimensions of a country’s national culture from Hofstede (1980 
and 2001), denoted as follows: uncertainty avoidance (UAIj), masculinity (MASj), individualism 
(IDVj), and power distance (PDIj). To control for the effect of competition on launch window 
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and launch price, we constructed a Herfindahl-Hirschman index (COMPij) for drug i in country j. 
This index is constructed by summing the squared market shares ( MS ) (based on revenues in the 
IMS Health data we obtained) of the m drugs in the same ATC4 category as drug i, at the time of 
launch of drug i in country j (
M
m
mjij MSCOMP
1
2 ). A high Herfindahl-Hirschman index indicates 
that there is little competition for drug i in country j. We operationalize the home country of the 
company launching a specific drug i in country j (HOMEij) as a dummy variable (= 1, if the 
company’s headquarter is located in the country of launch j, 0 otherwise) (Danzon et al., 2005; 
Kyle, 2006 and 2007).  
The variable SUMMERij is a dummy variable that captures whether the launch of drug i 
in country j occurs in the months July or August for countries in the Northern hemisphere or in 
the months January or February for countries in the Southern hemisphere whereas the variable 
EMEAj is a dummy variable that has the value 1 if a drug is launched in a country j that is part of 
the European Medicines Evaluation Agency’s decision zone (EMEA). A drug i’s defined daily 
dosage (DDDi ) in grams is the assumed average maintenance dose per day of a drug used for its 
main indication in adults (World Health Organization definition). We extracted the inflation rate 
(annual percentage change in GDP deflator)  in country j at the time of launch (INFLj) from the 
Worldbank. Finally, we denote the 28 dummy variables for the 29 therapeutic classes a drug i 
belongs to as 
iATC  (see Table 2). We treat the therapeutic class A10BG as the base category. 
Table 3 gives an overview of the descriptives of the aforementioned variables (for correlation 
matrix, see Table A.1. in Appendix A). 
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3.3. Descriptive Statistics 
Table 4 provides an overview of the countries’ descriptives with regard to launch window 
and launch price. The first column in Table 4 contains the countries we study, classified by world 
region. These countries are ranked from early to late within world regions based on the launch 
window (from early to late launch) in the second column. To calculate mean launch leads and 
lags, we used the following procedure. We first computed the mean launch window for each 
drug across the countries. Then, we subtracted this mean launch window of the drug from each 
country-specific launch window for that drug. Third, we averaged these country-specific launch 
windows over all drugs launched in each specific country to obtain mean leads and lags for each 
specific country. A mean lead (-) indicates that drugs are typically launched early in a country, 
while a mean lag (+) indicates that drugs are typically launched late in a country.  
Variable (abbreviation used in Table A.1.) Average [Range] 
 Launch Price in U.S. Dollars in Grams (V1)
5 28.051[0.35;3,945,160] 
Launch Window (V2) 21.86 [0;128] 
Ex-Manufacturer Price Regulation (V3) 0.62 [0;1] 
Profit Control Regulation (V4) 0.19 [0;1] 
Cross-Country Reference Pricing Regulation (V5) 0.69 [0;1] 
Therapeutic Reference Pricing Regulation (V6) 0.41 [0;1] 
Pharmaco-Economic Evidence Regulation (V7) 0.49 [0;1] 
Strength of Patent Protection (V8) 3.62 [1.98;5] 
Population Size (V9) 17,192,779 [404,335;294,267,566] 
Health Expenditures per Capita (V10) 1,361 [126;6,015] 
Uncertainty Avoidance (V11) 68.93 [23;112] 
Masculinity (V12) 53.06 [5;95] 
Individualism (V13) 57.70 [8;91] 
Power Distance (V14) 49.66 [11;94] 
Competition (V15) 0.61 [0.13;1] 
Firm’s Home Country (V16) 0.03 [0;1] 
EMEA (V17) 0.54 [0;1] 
Summer (V18) 0.14[0;1] 
Daily Dosage in Grams (V19) 0.23 [1.8010-5;6.75] 
Inflation (V20) 3.80 [-23;94] 
Table 3: Descriptives of variables 
                                                 
5 The high maximum launch price in U.S. dollars per gram corresponds to the price of a drug for which the 
dosage is very small. In the empirical analysis, we use the natural logartithm of launch price. We check for the effect 
of potential outliers which we report in section 5.1.  
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World Region and Countries Mean Lead (-) or Lag (+) in Launch 
Window (in Months) 
% Deviation from Mean Price at 
Launch per Gram  
North America -8.95 37.87 
U.S. -17.17 37.79 
Canada -7.50 -1.57 
Puerto Rico -7.21 93.09 
Mexico -3.94 22.16 
Western Europe -5.81 -8.15 
Germany -15.59 -9.17 
Denmark -10.65 -5.35 
U.K. -9.82 -0.14 
Austria -9.13 -9.92 
Switzerland -8.97 0.21 
Ireland -8.08 -5.22 
Sweden -7.11 -8.48 
Netherlands -6.95 -6.93 
Finland -6.44 -4.39 
Norway -5.87 3.83 
Spain -4.03 -17.22 
Belgium -3.45 -13.61 
Luxemburg -2.22 -12.78 
Portugal -1.66 -11.47 
Italy -1.01 -13.26 
France -0.46 -12.44 
Greece 2.06 -12.21 
South America -0.43 7.93 
Brazil -6.79 14.43 
Argentina -6.36 0.89 
Colombia -3.12 33.67 
Chile -2.27 -8.19 
Venezuela 1.97 17.49 
Uruguay 3.95 12.72 
Peru 4.29 -4.20 
Ecuador 4.91 -3.39 
Oceania 0.10 -8.02 
Australia -1.55 -11.82 
New Zealand 1.75 -4.21 
Asia 5.16 11.01 
Philippines -2.17 -12.15 
Japan 6.89 47.89 
Korea 10.75 -2.71 
Eastern Europe 8.74 -1.62 
Czech Republic 5.03 1.58 
Estonia 5.21 -3.51 
Hungary 5.68 -5.54 
Poland 8.91 1.71 
Latvia 9.55 -5.78 
Slovakia 12.77 0.78 
Lithuania 14.02 -0.61 
Africa and the Middle East 14.51 -13.31 
Kuwait 4.42 -1.81 
South Africa 5.14 -26.11 
United Arabic Emirates 6.49 4.33 
Lebanon 6.77 -16.32 
Jordan 12.37 -7.89 
Egypt 17.86 -29.10 
Saudi Arabia 19.40 -13.37 
Morocco 20.88 -8.67 
Tunisia 37.28 -20.82 
Table 4: Mean lead (-) or lag (+) in launch window and % deviation from mean price at 
launch by world region and country 
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Column 3 in Table 4 shows the countries’ deviation from the mean launch price across 
drugs. To calculate these deviations, we, first, computed the mean launch price for each drug 
across the countries. Then, within each drug, we computed the percentage deviation of the 
country-specific price from the mean price over all countries. Finally, we averaged these 
percentage deviations for each specific country over all drugs launched in that country. A 
negative deviation means that a drug is typically launched at a relatively low price in a country 
whereas a positive deviation indicates that a drug is typically launched at a relatively high price 
in a country. 
Our study is the first to give an overview of both mean launch lead and lag times and 
mean launch price deviations across such a broad spectrum of categories and countries, which 
leads to several new descriptive insights.  
First, we find that the U.S., Germany, and Denmark experience the largest lead in launch. 
Tunisia, Morocco, and Saudi Arabia experience the largest lag in launch. North America and 
Western Europe show similar (small) launch delays. Launch delays are largest in Eastern 
Europe, Africa and the Middle East. There is a marked difference in launch timing between 
Western Europe (fast) and Eastern Europe (slow), despite many of these launches having 
occurred recently. Puerto Rico, Japan, and the U.S. have the largest positive deviation from the 
average launch price worldwide whereas Egypt, South Africa, and Tunisia show the largest 
negative deviation from the worldwide average launch price. North America, South America, 
and Asia show positive deviations from the worldwide average launch price, while the other 
world regions – including Europe – show a negative deviation from the average launch price 
worldwide. 
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4. Model 
Let *
ijLW   be the launch window of drug i in country j and let 
*
ijLP  be the natural logarithm 
transformed ex-manufacturer price per gram at launch of drug i in country j. We do not always 
observe the actual values of *ijLW  and 
*
ijLP  since right censoring is present. Observed values are 
denoted by ijLW and ijLP . Censoring occurs for the drug-country combinations for which we do 
not observe a launch at the end of our observation window. Denote ijC  the censoring time, being 
the time between the end of the observation period and the drug-country specific launch date. For 
the observed launch window, we have that 
 
 
*
ijij LWLW    if ijij CLW
*
,       (1a) 
ijij CLW   otherwise.       (1b) 
Furthermore, the launch price ijLP  is only observed on the selected sample for which ijij CLW
* , 
and there *ijij LPLP . 
We have the following set of simultaneous equations: 
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'2*
2
*
1
* )( ijijijijij uLPLPLW Z       (2) 
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The vector 
1ijZ  contains the exogenous variables for the launch window equation and 2ijZ  
contains the exogenous variables for the launch price equation. The error terms 1iju  and 2iju are 
allowed to be correlated. Following Garen (1984), we consider *ijLW  and 
*
ijLP  as endogenous 
variables. Indeed, the firm and the regulator may both select the launch window with the goal of 
influencing the launch price, and the level of launch price with the goal of influencing the launch 
window. The omitted variables in 1iju include non-observable strategic variables used by the firm 
and the regulator to select the optimal value of *ijLW . One may expect that these strategic 
variables are correlated with the launch price. The omitted variables in 2iju  then include non-
observable strategic variables used by the firm and the regulator to select the optimal value of
*
ijLP . Similarly, one may expect that these strategic variables are correlated with the launch 
window. The inclusion of the quadratic terms in (2) and (3) allows testing of H1 and H2. We will 
test the robustness of our findings through other parametric and non-parametric specifications.   
To account for the endogeneity, we estimate the system of equations (2) and (3) using a 
three stage least squares (3SLS) procedure, as in Bayus, Kang, & Agarwal (2007). Additionally, 
we correct for right-censoring and selectivity using the same procedure as in Vella (1993) or 
Wooldridge (2002). 
 
To estimate the structural launch window equation (2), we first estimate the reduced form 
of the launch price equation by a Tobit regression of the second type (to account for the fact that 
we only observe prices if the drug has already been launched). This launch price equation 
contains two variables that influence launch price but not launch window, namely DDDi and 
INFLj, which serve as instruments for the launch price in the launch window equation. The 
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Sargent test does not lead to rejection of the validity of these instruments (p = 0.46). We add the 
generalized residuals of the reduced launch price equation as a correction term to equation (2). 
We validated the strength of the instruments by comparing Tobit regression models of launch 
window on the exogenous variables with and without the instruments DDDi and INFLj. The  
corresponding likelihood ratio test demonstrated these instruments to be significant (LR=625.11, 
p<0.01). The inclusion of instruments led to a relative increase in pseudo R-squared of 10%. 
To estimate the structural launch price equation (3), we first estimate the reduced form of 
the launch window equation by a Tobit regression of the first type (to account for the right 
censoring). This launch window equation contains two variables that influence launch window 
but not launch price, namely SUMMERij and EMEAj, which serve as instruments for the launch 
window in the launch price equation. The Sargent test does not indicate a rejection of the validity 
of these instruments (p =0.75). We add the generalized residuals of the reduced launch window 
equation as a correction term to equation (3). We tested for the strength of the instruments by 
computing the (pseudo) R-squared of the regression models of launch delay on the exogenous 
variables with and without the instruments SUMMERij and EMEAj. The corresponding likelihood 
ratio test demonstrated these instruments to be significant (LR=153.80, p<0.01). The inclusion of 
instruments led to a relative increase in pseudo R-squared of 5%. 
Replacing the vectors 1ijZ  (in equation 2) and 2ijZ  (in equation 3) by the exogenous 
variables leads then to equation (4) and equation (5), respectively 
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where LP  and LW  represent the generalized residuals or the selectivity variables. The use of 
generalized residuals is equivalent to the control function approach; the terms LP1  and  LW1  
in (4) and (5) are the control functions (see Petrin and Train (2010) for another application of 
control functions). The system of equations (4) and (5) is then jointly estimated as a system of 
equations using Generalized Least Squares. We also included random country effects in the 
equations to account for the fact that there are repeated observations across countries for most 
drugs. These random effects thus introduce a correlation, called the within-group correlation, 
between the error terms corresponding to the same country. 
In sum, the coefficients 1a  and 2a allow us to test for hypothesis 1 (the causal effect of 
launch price on launch window while controlling for the joint determination of launch window 
and launch price), whereas the coefficients 1b  and 2b  allow us to test for hypothesis 2 (the causal 
effect of launch window on launch price while controlling for the joint determination of launch 
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window and launch price). The variables 
LW
 and LP  capture the simultaneous determination 
of launch window and launch price. These variables measure whether launch window is 
strategically selected as a function of launch price and vice versa. 
For clarification, note that the expressed non-linear relationships in equations (4) and (5) 
are not each other´s flip side. Even in a simple regression context, with a fitted regression 
equation bXaY
^
, it is not true that a regression of X on Y yields as estimated regression 
equation baYX /)(
^
. Thus, the estimated slope of regressing Y on X is not the inverse of the 
estimated slope of regressing X on Y. If there is only one explanatory variable, the sign of the 
slopes will be equal, but when controlling for other variables one loses this property. In the 
special case of curvilinear effects, as in our case, the effects are not each other's flip side either.  
 
5. Results 
In Table 5, we present the explanatory variables in the first column. The second column 
contains the hypothesis number and the sign of the hypothesized expected effect for the launch 
window equation. We report the parameter estimates,their standard errors, and the significance 
levels for the launch window equation in the third, fourth, and fifth column. The sixth column in 
Table 5 shows the hypothesis number and the sign of the hypothesized effect for the launch price 
equation. The seventh, eight, and ninth column in Table 5 present the parameter estimates, their 
standard errors, and the significance levels for the launch price equation. We find evidence for 
random country effects in the launch window equation because of an intra-country correlation 
coefficient of 8% whereas we do not find this evidence for the launch price equation. We first 
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discuss the results of the launch window equation and we then turn to the results of the launch 
price equation.  
Consistent with hypothesis one (H1), we find a U-shaped effect of launch price on launch 
window (a1 = -5.65, p<0.01 and a2 = 0.33, p<0.01). This relation is depicted graphically in 
Figure 1, based on the full model coefficients, and within our observation window
6
. The values 
of the exogenous variables are set at their average value across the sample. Figure 1 shows that 
on average, the launch window is smallest at Ln(launch price) =8.63 (standard error of 1.08). 
This means that the launch window is smallest at a launch price that deviates 53% from the 
lowest price point. 
The effect of ex-manufacturer price regulation is non-significant (p=0.15) although it 
does have the expected positive sign (H3a). As expected, profit regulation ( 2 = 16.07, p<0.01) 
has a positive influence on launch window (H4a). 
The effect of cross-country reference pricing regulation is not significant (H5a). 
Countries with therapeutic reference pricing regulation ( 4 = 4.19, p<0.05) and 
pharmacoeconomic evidence regulation (
5
= 3.40, p<0.10) experience a larger launch window 
(H6a and H7a) whereas countries with a stronger patent protection have a smaller launch 
window (
6
= -5.96, p<0.01) (H8a). Next, we discuss the results for the control variables in the 
launch window equation. Launch occurs earlier in countries with a larger population size (
7
= -
1.98, p<0.05) whereas health expenditures per capita significantly increase the launch window (
8
= 19.23, p<0.01).  
 
                                                 
6  The horizontal axis becomes negative because the launch price per gram in U.S. dollars is Ln-transformed.  
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 Hypothesis 
Number 
(Hypothesized 
Effect) 
Launch Window 
Equation (LWE) 
Hypothesis 
Number 
(Hypothesized 
Effect) 
Launch Price 
Equation (LPE) 
  
  
Coefficient S.E. Sign. 
 
Coefficient S.E. Sign. 
Constant ( 0 , 0 ) 
  -41.90 5.99 ***  3.19 0.86 *** 
Launch Price (a1)   -5.65 0.80 ***  / /  
Launch Price*Launch Price (a2)  H1 (U) 0.33 0.04 ***  / /  
Launch Window (b1)   / /   0.03 5.1010
-3 *** 
Launch Window*Launch Window (b2)   / /  H2 (∩) -1.7910
-4 5.8910-5 *** 
Selectivity Variable ( 1 , 1 ) 
  2.77 0.69 ***  -2.32 2.81  
Ex-Manufacturer Price Regulation ( 1 , 1 ) 
 H3a (+) 3.75 2.55  H3b (-) -0.14 0.09  
Profit Control Regulation ( 2 , 2 ) 
 H4a (+) 16.07 3.02 *** H4b (-) -0.14 0.11  
Cross-Country Reference Pricing Regulation ( 3 , 3 ) 
 H5a (-) -3.44 2.45  H5b (+) 0.06 0.12  
Therapeutic Reference Pricing Regulation ( 4 , 4 ) 
 H6a (+) 4.19 1.92 ** H6b (-) -0.13 0.09  
Pharmaco-Economic Evidence Regulation ( 5 , 5 ) 
 H7a (+) 3.40 1.76 * H7b (-) -0.03 0.09  
Strength of Patent Protection ( 6 , 6 ) 
 H8a (-) -5.96 1.89 *** H8b (-) -0.07 0.09  
Population Size (
7
,
7
)   -1.98 0.79 **  0.07 0.04 * 
Health Expenditures per Capita (
8
,
8
)   19.23 1.75 ***  -7.3710
-3 0.09  
Uncertainty Avoidance ( 9 , 9 ) 
  -0.20 0.06 ***  -1.4510-3 2.8210-3  
Masculinity ( 10 , 10 ) 
  0.25 0.05 ***  -1.7110-3 2.3310-3  
Individualism ( 11 , 11 ) 
  -0.37 0.07 ***  -3.6210-4 3.2210-3  
Power Distance ( 12 , 12 ) 
  0.33 0.08 ***  -6.0410-3 3.8210-3  
Competition (
13
,
13
) (Reverse-scored)   2.57 2.38   0.65 0.24 *** 
Firm's Home Country ( 14 , 14 ) 
  -6.34 2.41 ***  0.44 0.23 * 
Summer (
15
)   -1.96 1.14 *  / /  
EMEA (
16
)   -4.01 2.14 *  / /  
Daily Dosage (
15
)   / /   -3.08 0.18 *** 
Inflation (
16
)   / /   9.7910
-3 8.2910-3  
Anatomical Therapeutic Classes ( i , i ; i = 1…28) 
    ***    *** 
N   1711  1711 
Adjusted R-Squared   0.26  0.66 
Significance (Sign.) levels (two-sided): *: p<0.10; **: p<0.05; ***: p<0.01 /S.E.: standard error 
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Table 5: Estimation results of system equation with random country effects
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Figure 1: The U-shaped effect of launch price on launch window 
 
As to culture, countries high in uncertainty avoidance (
9
= -0.20, p<0.01) or high in 
individualism ( 11 = -0.37, p<0.01) have a smaller launch window than countries low in 
uncertainty avoidance or low in individualism. Countries high in masculinity (
10
= 0.25, 
p<0.01)  and power distance ( 12 = 0.33, p<0.01)  have a larger launch window than countries 
low in masculinity and power distance. The extent of competition in the category the new drug is 
entering does not significantly influence the launch window. As expected, firms launch new 
drugs faster in their home country ( 14 = -6.34, p<0.01). Firms also launch faster in Summer ( 15
= -1.96, p<0.10) and in countries belonging to the EMEA zone (
16
= -4.01, p<0.10). The 
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therapeutic category dummies are jointly significant (p<0.01); we do not report their specific 
estimates for reasons of brevity (but they are available from authors upon request).  
Turning to the launch price equation, we find support for the inverted U-shaped effect of 
launch window on launch price, posited in H2 (b1 = 0.03, p<0.01 and b2 = -1.7910
-4
, p<0.01). 
This relation is depicted graphically in Figure 2 (based on the full model coefficients; the values 
of launch window on the horizontal axis of Figure 2 remain within our observation window). 
Figure 2 shows that a launch window of 85 months (standard error of 17 months) is associated 
with the highest launch price. Because of the lag between the initial research on a compound that 
could become a drug, and the drug actually entering the market, Grabowski & Kyle (2007) 
estimate a drug’s average market exclusivity period to be approximately 11 years, but with a 
high variance surrounding this value. The launch window of 7 years thus seems to have face 
validity. After 7 years, ethical drug companies and health regulators increasingly align on lower 
prices for the reasons we stipulated in the theory section above. Also interestingly, the decrease 
in launch price between 7 and 11 years after launch is moderate. This is due to the selection of 
drugs of which we observe launch in a 12-year data window, according to IMS Health data 
storage procedures. We expect that the decrease beyond 7 years would be more expressed if we 
would have been able to trace drug launches over a longer data window, e.g. 20 years. 
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Figure 2: The inverted U-shaped effect of launch window on launch price 
 
Surprisingly, regulatory restrictions – although the effect signs are in line with our 
expectations - do not significantly influence launch price, contrary to H3b-H8b. Stremersch and 
Lemmens (2009) and Ekelund and Persson (2003) found that launch prices in regulated markets 
may not be higher than launch prices in non-regulated markets, while prices in the regulated 
markets decrease at a much higher rate than prices in non-regulated markets. Danzon and Chao 
(2000b) have also shown the latter. Apparently, regulatory restrictions are more useful to 
regulators to constrain the price of mature drugs than of newly launched drugs. From 
conversations with the industry, we speculate that a reason may be that regulators have limited 
information on newly launched drugs that may guide potential price or profit caps they may 
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impose. Pharmaco-economic evidence in the own country is more limited at launch than later on 
in  a drug’s life cycle. Therapeutic benefits as compared to alternatives are still partially unclear 
as real-life medical practice may lead to different therapeutic outcomes, as compared to 
outcomes in controlled clinical trials. Profits that the firm may obtain from a new drug are 
relatively unclear compared to the profits it may obtain from a mature drug, given the extent to 
which a new drug diffuses in medical practice may be uncertain.  
Launch in large countries (i.e., a high population size) occurs at a higher price than in 
small countries (
7
= 0.07, p<0.10). We do not find any evidence for an effect of health 
expenditures per capita on launch price. As mentioned before, increasing health expenditures per 
capita may be indicative of both a higher willingness to provide good healthcare to citizens and a 
higher budget pressure, which may cancel each other out. A country’s culture does not influence 
the launch price of a new drug. 
Competition drives down launch price (
13
= 0.65, p<0.01; reverse-scored). Firms obtain 
higher launch prices in their domestic market than in foreign markets ( 14 = 0.44, p<0.10). As 
expected, the higher the daily dosage of a drug that is needed, the lower the price per gram of the 
drug (
15
= -3.08, p<0.01). The therapeutic category dummies are also jointly significant 
(p<0.01) in the launch price equation. 
As to the selectivity variables, we find that the coefficient of this variable in the launch 
window equation ( 1  = 2.77, p<0.01) is significant. If launch price is higher than expected based 
on the values of the explanatory variables, the launch window is also larger. This finding may 
indicate that health regulators act strategically in delaying market access for expensive drugs, 
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which is against the interests of the ethical drug company. The parameter 1  in the launch price 
equation is non-significant. 
5.1. Robustness Checks 
We conducted many robustness checks, presented in Table 6. Adjusted R-squared 
measures are only given for models that are computed from the full sample.  
First, we checked whether the functional form we chose (quadratic) is appropriate. We 
find that our model outperforms a linear model (adj. R-squared of 0.23 and 0.65 for the linear 
model versus 0.26 and 0.66 for the quadratic model). Our model has the same fit as a cubic 
model (adj. R-squared of 0.26 and 0.66 for both models). The pattern of the effect in the cubic 
model approaches the pattern of the effect in the quadratic model. Thus, we opt for the 
parsimony of the quadratic model. We also estimated equations (2) and (3) in a semi-parametric 
way. The model specification for the launch window equation (2) becomes: 
11
'** )( ijijijij uLPmLW Z        (6) 
with m a smooth, but unknown function. This is a semi-parametric model, because the 
exogenous variables still enter the model in a linear way. The relationship between launch price 
and launch window is however completely non-parametric. We then estimate the regression 
function m by generalized additive models.  We use the same approach for the semi-parametric 
estimation of the price equation (equation 3). The pattern of the effect in the semi-parametric 
model approaches the pattern of the effect in the quadratic model. 
Second, we randomly excluded specific therapeutic categories, countries and drugs. Our 
model results were robust to such exclusions, as shown in Table 6 for the exclusion of complete 
categories (results of country and drug exclusions available from the authors upon request). The 
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only exception is the exclusion of ATC1 category 3, in which case the inverted U-shaped effect 
of launch window on launch price turns insignificant. We also checked for potential outliers by 
excluding the country with the highest price for each molecule. Our results stay robust. 
Third, we also examined alternate operationalizations of several variables. For instance, 
Table 6 shows that the model is robust to alternate measures for competition (i.e. using number 
of competitors instead of the Herfindahl index we mentioned earlier) and population size (i.e. 
only counting people older than 15 years of age). Alternate operationalizations of control 
variables yielded similar effects. 
 
Model specification Effect of launch price on 
launch window U-shaped? 
Effect of launch window on 
launch price inverted U-shaped? 
Linear model / / 
Cubic model Yes Yes 
Semi-parametric model Yes  Yes 
Exclusion of ATC1 category 1 Yes Yes 
Exclusion of ATC1 category 2 Yes Yes 
Exclusion of ATC1 category 3 Yes No 
Exclusion of ATC1 category 4 Yes Yes 
Exclusion of ATC1 category 5 Yes Yes 
Exclusion of country with highest 
price for each molecule 
Yes Yes 
Nr of competitors instead of HI Yes Yes 
Size of population older than 15 years 
instead of total population size 
Yes Yes 
Table 6: Robustness checks 
6. Discussion and Implications 
This paper yields interesting insights in the complex phenomenon of international launch 
behavior by ethical drug firms and their interaction with health regulators. While controlling for 
the simultaneity in the decision on international launch timing and launch price, we find that 
international launch price has a U-shaped effect on launch window whereas the international 
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launch window has an inverted U-shaped effect on launch price. Health regulators behave 
strategically in increasing a new drug’s launch delay the more expensive the new drug is. 
Moreover, we gain further insight into factors influencing, on the one hand, launch window and, 
on the other hand, launch price. While regulation influences launch window, we do not find this 
influence of regulation on launch price. Our findings give insights to managers and public policy 
makers, while the limitations of our work yield opportunities for future research. 
International launch window and price have an important impact on companies’ bottom 
line (Danzon et al., 2005; Wagner & McCarthy, 2004). Stremersch and Lemmens (2009) showed 
that launch window of pharmaceuticals does not influence the sales pattern. However, as we 
show that launch window and launch price are interrelated, launch window will influence the 
revenues of firms through launch price and the time the drug is on the market under patent 
protection. The contribution of our results to ethical drug firms primarily lies in enhancing their 
understanding of international launch window and price patterns. The patterns we find, inform 
firms on launch windows and prices that are common across countries in our sample. This 
descriptive information and the interconnection between launch price and launch window allows 
them to build more informed decisions for international market entry.  
Our research can also inform public policy administrators on launch windows and launch 
prices, both of which are relevant to their healthcare policy. Popular press sometimes points at 
individual cases on how a drug was launched late in a country or how the price of a specific drug 
is higher in one country, as compared to other countries. For example, the anti-allergy drug 
Xyzall has been launched in the U.S. with a significant delay in comparison to many other 
countries (Global Insight, 2007). The launch price of Pfizer’s statin Lipitor was €0.60 in Paris 
(France) whereas the launch price of that same pill was $3.98 in Philadelphia (the U.S.) (Capell, 
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2003). Typically, such stories in the popular press are very much based on a single case. For 
every single country, we can come up with at least one drug that was introduced very late or 
priced very highly. The popular press typically generalizes much beyond the single case they cite 
to make inference on the country’s healthcare policy, often to support criticism on the latter. This 
study provides public policy analysts with more quantitative evidence on a broad sample of 
countries and categories.  
Furthermore, our model can give insights into hypothetical situations as long as such 
situations occur within the bounds of variation observed in our data. Thus, we can gauge the 
effect of a change in launch window on launch price and vice versa, using the estimates for the 
causal effects between both decision variables we reported above, controlling for the 
simultaneity in the launch price and launch window decisions. For example, Lipitor’s 
(atorvastatin) launch in 1998 in Belgium had a launch window of 15 months. If the launch of 
Lipitor occurred one month earlier, its launch price in Belgium would have been 2.51% (S.E. = 
0.43%) lower than its actual launch price. Thus, health regulators may not only increase patients’ 
access to new drugs by granting earlier access but such early access may also come at a lower 
price. Ethical drug companies accept such lower price because they get more time to recoup their 
R&D investment. A similar exercise for Lipitor in all countries, reveals that, in relative terms, 
the biggest launch price decrease would be in the U.K.(-3.04%) and the smallest launch price 
decrease would be in Tunisia (-1.21%). On the other hand, a 10% increase in price of Lipitor 
(from $70.64 to $77.70) in Belgium, would have led to a decrease in launch window with 0.25 
months, which translates to 8 days (S.E. = 3 days). A similar exercise for Lipitor in all countries 
reveals a decrease in launch windows between 0.22 months, which translates to 7 days (New 
Zealand) and 0.29 months, which translates to 9 days (Columbia). Although such calculations are 
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conditional upon other variables remaining equal and are purely illustrative, we gain insight on 
the magnitude of the interdependencies of these two important decisions, launch timing and 
launch price.  
7.  Limitations and Future Research 
First, our results are context-specific as the focus is on the pharmaceutical industry. 
Therefore, one should exert caution in generalizing beyond this research context. Whereas one 
can argue that this creates a narrow appeal, one should consider the economic and substantive 
importance of this industry (Stremersch & Van Dyck, 2009; Stremersch, 2008).  
Second, we do not specify the objective function of firms and health regulators. The 
reason is that it is not clear whether the objective function of health regulators is access to 
healthcare or controlling healthcare budgets. Although a model of the dynamic game between 
health regulator and ethical drug company would be of great interest, it is considered to be 
outside of the scope of this paper.  
Third, one can easily critique the simple operationalization of the complex regulatory 
environment. Operationalizing the regulatory context across countries in more detail, while 
challenging, could be insightful. For example, further research could try to explicitly take into 
account the interdependencies that occur between countries because of the cross-country 
reference pricing regulation. We controlled for this system through a dummy variable but richer 
insights could be obtained by gathering data on the reference set of each country that applies 
such a system.  
Fourth, launch window and launch price decisions are decisions that are made in a 
complex environment. Although we control for many variables for sake of completeness, we 
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acknowledge that we may not capture all possible variables. However, given the diversity of the 
variables we control for and the many robustness checks we performed, we feel confident about 
our findings.  
Fifth, while we provide evidence for variation in drugs’ availability across countries and 
drugs’ launch prices, we do not have data on the price patients actually pay (the level of “co-
pay”). Even if a drug’s price is low, patients in some countries can still be excluded from access 
to this drug, because of a high co-payment. Data on how much patients actually co-pay across 
countries would add insights, but to our knowledge, this data is unavailable at the drug-country 
level.  
Sixth, beyond launch timing and launch price, one may consider the launch sequence of a 
new drug across countries. While optimizing launch sequence for new drugs is outside the scope 
of the present paper, it is certainly of high relevance, given cross-country spill-over (e.g. due to 
cross-country reference pricing) in drug prices. 
Seventh, we find that the effect of regulation on drug launch prices is insignificant. While 
this confirms earlier findings of Stremersch and Lemmens (2009) and Ekelund and Persson 
(2003), we can only speculate as to the reasons why this happens (i.e. higher budget pressure for 
the regulator from mature drugs than from newly launched drugs). This reasoning is in line with 
Danzon and Chao (2000b) who show that regulation has an effect on the price evolution of the 
life cycle of a drug. Future research that examines the health regulator’s use of regulatory 
restrictions to drug prices over drugs’ life cycle may be very valuable as it may uncover the 
reasons for the patterns we discovered. However, given our focus on launch, this investigation is 
beyond the scope of the present paper.  
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Eight, the drug prices in our model are expressed in a common denominator, namely US 
dollars per gram, as converted from the local currency by IMS Health in the month of launch. A 
formal analysis of the macro-economic influence of the exchange rate on drug prices is, while 
potentially interesting, beyond the scope of the present paper. Our findings are robust to the 
exclusion of specific countries as well as exclusion of specific time periods from the sample, 
alleviating concerns that our findings may be driven by countries with strong currency 
fluctuation in specific time periods (e.g. Brazil in 2002-2003). 
Given the business and societal relevance of international launch and pricing of 
pharmaceuticals and the limitations of prior studies in this field, including of our present study, 
we expect much more work on this topic to be undertaken by scholars in both economics and 
marketing.  
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Appendix A 
 
 V1 V2 V3 V4 V5 V6 V7 V8 V9 V10 V11 V12 V13 V14 V15 V16 V17 V18 V19 V20 
V1 1.00                    
V2 -0.09 1.00                   
V3 0.01 0.12 1.00                  
V4 0.01 0.12 -0.03 1.00                 
V5 0.01 0.09 0.47 0.05 1.00                
V6 -0.03 -0.03 -0.04 -0.22 0.10 1.00               
V7 -0.00 -0.02 0.04 0.01 0.23 0.20 1.00              
V8 -0.03 -0.22 -0.11 -0.13 -0.02 0.09 0.02 1.00             
V9 -0.00 -0.09 -0.12 0.10 -0.40 -0.10 -0.16 0.24 1.00            
V10 0.02 -0.18 0.06 -0.30 0.16 0.13 0.08 0.62 -0.08 1.00           
V11 0.01 0.22 0.24 0.14 0.24 -0.09 -0.20 -0.48 -0.02 -0.33 1.00          
V12 -0.01 0.05 -0.06 -0.02 0.02 -0.07 -0.25 0.04 0.24 0.10 0.25 1.00         
V13 -0.01 -0.15 -0.10 -0.15 0.21 0.35 0.27 0.52 -0.15 0.62 -0.51 0.00 1.00        
V14 0.00 0.20 0.05 0.11 -0.17 -0.11 -0.10 -0.63 0.26 -0.57 0.57 0.19 -0.62 1.00       
V15 0.15 -0.02 -0.00 0.04 0.04 0.00 0.06 -0.04 -0.09 -0.06 -0.02 -0.03 0.03 -0.03 1.00      
V16 -0.00 -0.14 -0.14 -0.04 -0.17 -0.09 -0.07 0.25 0.21 0.27 0.14 0.06 0.19 -0.09 -0.04 1.00     
V17 0.01 -0.01 0.02 0.08 0.32 0.19 0.08 0.03 -0.43 0.15 0.11 -0.09 0.33 -0.25 0.03 -0.07 1.00    
V18 0.02 -0.04 -0.03 -0.08 -0.14 -0.03 -0.04 0.01 0.05 -0.05 -0.04 -0.04 -0.08 0.04 -0.02 0.00 -0.07 1.00   
V19 -0.36 0.13 -0.05 -0.00 0.04 0.00 0.00 0.08 0.03 0.05 -0.07 -0.03 0.03 -0.06 -0.06 0.04 -0.03 0.00 1.00  
V20 0.04 0.05 -0.02 0.10 -0.07 -0.12 -0.12 -0.30 0.07 -0.35 0.12 0.09 -0.26 0.30 -.02 -0.09 -0.14 0.02 -0.00 1.00 
                Emboldened correlations are significant at p < 0.05 (two-sided tests). 
Table 3 in section 3.3. represents the labels of the variables used in this matrix. This correlation matrix shows 
correlations between the variables as they are operationalized and included in the model. 
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